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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark S. Wilbanks appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The facts underlying Wilbanks' convictions and the proceedings through his
direct appeal were described by the district court as follows:
On May 13, 2010, a jury found Mark Shane Wilbanks guilty of: (1)
Domestic Violence with Traumatic Injury, a felony; (2) Domestic Assault, a
misdemeanor; and (3) Witness Intimidation, a felony.
On June 25, 2010, the Hon. Judge McLaughlin entered a Judgment
and Commitment, which reflected that Count IV (Violation of a No Contact
Order) had been dismissed by the State and the Defendant had pied guilty
to being a persistent violator under Idaho Code§ 19-2514.
On Count I, Domestic Violence, felony, the Defendant received an
aggregate ten (10) year sentence, with a minimum period of confinement
of seven (7) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period not to
exceed three (3) years. On Count Ill, Intimidating a Witness, felony, the
Defendant received an aggregate five (5) year sentence, with a minimum
period of confinement of three (3) years, followed by a subsequent
indeterminate period not to exceed two (2) years, to run concurrently with
Count I. On Count II, Domestic Assault, misdemeanor, the Defendant
received one-hundred fifty-nine (159) days in the Ada County jail, with
credit for one-hundred fifty-nine (159) days served. For being a persistent
violator, the Defendant received a thirty (30) year sentence, with a
minimum period of confinement of seven (7) years, followed by a
subsequent indeterminate period not to exceed twenty three (23) years, to
run concurrently with the other sentences.
The Defendant appealed his sentences and, in an unpublished
opinion issued February 27, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction and sentences. State of Idaho v. Mark Wilbanks,
Docket No 37837 (Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2012).
(R., p.107.)
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On June 21, 2011, Wilbanks filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief with a
supporting affidavit and attachments (R., pp.4-72), claiming, inter alia, that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate documents and records showing alleged
prior bad acts of the victim, including lying to police when intoxicated, filing false
charges, recanting statements made to police, and attempting suicide (R., pp.13-15, 6672). After counsel was appointed to represent Wilbanks (R., p.86), the state filed an
Answer requesting Wilbanks' claims be dismissed because they could have been raised
on direct appeal and they failed to present a genuine issue of material fact (R., pp.96100).
The district court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss, stating its intention to dismiss
Wilbanks' ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the grounds that (1) under I.C. §
19-4901 (b), it was waived because it could have been raised on direct appeal, and (2)
Wilbanks failed to "allege[] facts that would show that his attorney's performance was
deficient, nor [did] he allege[] facts that would show prejudice resulting from the claimed
deficient performance."

(R., pp.115-116.)

The court gave Wilbanks twenty days 'to

respond to its notice (R, p.118) and, after that period of time ran without receiving any
response, the district court entered a judgment summarily dismissing Wilbanks' petition
for post-conviction relief (R., pp.120-121). Wilbanks filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.122-125.)
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ISSUE

Wilbanks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Wilbanks'
ineffective assistance of counsel claim?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Wilbanks failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
petition for post-conviction relief?

3

ARGUMENT
Wilbanks Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Wilbanks argues that "the district court erred when it summarily

dismissed his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney
failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness."
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Wilbanks specifically contends "the district court erred when it
concluded that the claim was waived because it should have been raised on direct
appeal, and when it concluded that the claim concerned a strategic decision that could
not be reviewed in post-conviction."

(Id., p.4. 1)

However, the strategic decision

Wilbanks focuses on is trial counsel's decision to not call him as a witness to testify
about the victim's alleged prior bad acts because the prosecutor allegedly threatened to
impeach Wilbanks with his prior felony convictions if he testified.

(Id. pp.8-10.)

Regardless of whether the decision challenged on appeal is trial counsel's
alleged decision to not investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts (and crossexamine her on them) or counsel's decision to not call Wilbanks as a witness to testify
about the victim's alleged prior bad acts, application of the correct legal standards to

In light of the Idaho appellate courts' preference that ineffective assistance of counsel
claims be presented in post-conviction proceedings instead of direct appeals, the state
does not contest Wilbanks' contention that his ineffectiveness claim was not waived by
any failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. See State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 433,
34 P .3d 1110, 1116 (Ct. App. 2001) ("This Court has consistently held that the
appropriate procedure for adult criminal defendants to bring an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim is through an application for post-conviction relief.")
4
1

Wilbanks' claim shows that because he did not present a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the district court properly summarily dismissed it.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate

court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief.
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992). "On review of a
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, [appellate
courts] will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings,
depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally construe
the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Kelly v. State,
149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010).

C.

Standards Applicable To Summary Dismissal Of Post-Conviction Claims
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 provides for the summary disposition of an

application for post-conviction relief. Summary disposition is appropriate when the
applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in
the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief.

Downing v.

State, 132 Idaho 861,863,979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. App. 1999); Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 813,816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1995).
In order to raise a genuine issue of material fact, the "application must present or
be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application
will be subject to dismissal." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272, 61 P.3d 626, 629
5

(Ct. App. 2002); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 806, 69 P.3d 1064, 1067 (Ct. App.
2003) (citing Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994)).
The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v.
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873
P.2d at 901. If a petitioner fails to present evidence establishing an essential element
on which he bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate.

Mata v.

State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the issues on
appeal are first, whether the petition alleged facts, which, if true, would entitle the
applicant to relief, Griffith v. State, 121 Idaho 371,373,825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992),
and second, whether those allegations were "supported by written statements from
witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge,
or [are] based upon otherwise verifiable information." Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,
617,651 P.2d 546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982).
Review of the record in this case shows that the district court properly granted
summary dismissal because Wilbanks failed to raise a material issue of fact to support
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and his bald assertions are not supported by
the record.

D.

Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance

of counsel, he must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and
that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 6876

688 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).
To establish deficient performance,

the petitioner must overcome the strong

presumption that counsel's performance was adequate and "show that his attorney's
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness."

Baldwin v. State, 145

Idaho 148, 153-154, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (citations omitted).

A reviewing

court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the alleged error without hindsight
and presumes that "trial counsel was competent and that trial tactics were based on
sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47
(1997) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 680-81 (1984)). "Rare are the
situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will
be limited to any one technique or approach." Harrington v. Richter,_ U.S._, 131
S.Ct. 770, 789 (2011) (internal quotes omitted). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not
be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-154, 177 P.3d at 367-368.
To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that but
for his attorney's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different."

E.

kl

Wilbanks has failed to meet this burden.

A Review Of The Record Shows Wilbanks Has Not Demonstrated Error In The
Dismissal Of His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Wilbanks bore the burden of presenting evidence showing that counsel's

decision to not investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts, and impeach her with
them through cross-examination and/or testimony by Wilbanks, was deficient and
7

prejudicial performance under the facts of the case. See Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,
407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249 (Ct. App. 1989). The deficiency in the investigation must be
an objective one, not merely a belief that a better or more thorough investigation would
have resulted in favorable evidence. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 19,966 P.2d 1, 19
(1998); see Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) ("in considering claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel" for failure to conduct adequate pretrial investigation,
the Court does not address "what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is
constitutionally compelled" (brackets, quotations and citations omitted)); Strickland, 466
U.S. at 691 ("a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments"); Code v. Montgomery, 799 F.2d 1481, 1484 (11 th Cir. 1986)
("[f]ailure to conduct a pretrial investigation and interview witnesses is not a per se sixth
amendment violation").
Wilbanks claimed in his post-conviction petition that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate documents and records showing alleged prior bad
acts of the victim, including lying to police when intoxicated, filing false charges,
recanting statements made to police, and attempting suicide.

(R., pp.13-15, 66-72.)

The district court summarily dismissed Wilbanks' claim, explaining that his supporting
affidavits showed "trial counsel considered [Wilbanks'] request that counsel obtain
certain evidence and made reasonable efforts to obtain that evidence; and . . . trial
counsel had strategic reasons why he did not pursue the course that [Wilbanks] now
advocates in hindsight." (R., p.117.) The court cited statements from one of Wilbanks'
affidavits, which alleged, "[o]n the day of trial, public defender said he wasn't able to get
8

'letter of recant' because its not in existance [sic] no more,' and 'wasn't able to get the
police records/medical records because prosecution warned him if I tried to bring up
that information, the prosecution would get me convicted on being an ex-felon alone
when I get on the stand." 2 (R., p.117 (verbatim from Notice of Intent to Dismiss); see R.,
p.70 (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts).)

The record supports the district

court's determination that Wilbanks' trial counsel made reasonable efforts to obtain
evidence to impeach the victim, as well as a reasoned strategic decision to not impeach
the victim by having Wilbanks testify about the victim's alleged prior bad acts. In short,
based on Wilbanks' own affidavit, his trial counsel made a reasonable investigation into
the victim's alleged prior bad acts and also determined that the benefit of having
Wilbanks testify about them did not outweigh the adverse impact his prior felony
convictions would have if he testified.
On appeal Wilbanks contends it is "possible" to conclude from the district court's
decision that the reason trial counsel did not conduct "an adequate cross-examination of
the alleged victim was a fear that the State would cross-examine Mr. Wilbanks
concerning prior felony convictions if he testified." 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.8.) Wilbanks
further states that, taking all inferences in his favor, "this indicates that defense counsel
2

Wilbanks' argument appears to be based on the assertion that the victim's prior bad
acts should have been presented to the jury through testimony by Wilbanks. (See
Appellant's Brief, pp.8-10.)
3

Wilbanks' argument -- that trial counsel's reasons for not calling Wilbanks to testify
can be ascertained from the district court's decision -- is unavailing. On appeal from a
summary dismissal order, the issue is whether the petitioner presented admissible
evidence that there is "a genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." I.C. § 19-4906(c); Downing, 132 Idaho at 863, 979
P.2d at 1221. The "fact" of what trial counsel's reasons were for not having Wilbanks
testify must be established by supporting evidence, not the district court's decision.
9

made a tactical decision based on a potentially unlawful threat by the prosecutor, as
felony convictions are not automatically permissible grounds for impeachment."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 (emphasis added).) Wilbanks argues that the court erred in
finding his trial counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to not impugn the victim's
credibility, when, instead, counsel's decision was based on ignorance of the law.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-10 ('That the district court's dismissal of the claim on the belief
that it represented a strategic decision rests on its assumption that the strategic
decision was rational and not the result of ignorance of the law is evident . . . . ").)
However, the record before the district court is devoid of any evidence of any objective
shortcoming by counsel or resulting prejudice.

From the underlying trial record, and

given the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct is within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance, it is clear that trial counsel made the tactical
decision to not call Wilbanks as a witness at trial because Wilbanks' credibility would
have been impeached by his prior felony convictions under l.R.E. 609 if he did.
Wilbanks' argument fails also because it is based on a factual claim that the
prosecutor made a "potentially unlawful threat" to impeach him with his prior felony
convictions if he testified about alleged prior bad acts by the victim, unsupported by
admissible evidence or the law. Even if the prosecutor informed trial counsel that he
intended to admit evidence of Wilbanks' prior felonies if he testified at trial, the
prosecutor was entitled to attempt to do so under l.R.E. 609.

Merely informing the

defense of the state's intent to admit a witness's prior felony convictions does not
constitute an unlawful threat. See State v. Schumacher, 136 Idaho 509, 37 P.3d 6 (Ct.
App. 2001) (the threat to arrest Schumacher's wife was "not unjustified" because if the
10

officers had discovered evidence linking her to the marijuana cultivation, it would have
justified her arrest); United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d 590, 594-595 (5th Cir. 1983)
("Involuntariness is present if there are threats or promises of illegitimate action," but
statements that if parents were arrested, officers would have to place the children with
welfare authorities were true). Here, the prosecutor's alleged expressed intent to use
I.RE. 609 to impeach Wilbanks' credibility with prior felony convictions if he testified
was legally proper, and can in no way be branded "potentially unlawful."

(See

Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9.)
Wilbanks' characterization of the prosecutor's alleged comment as "potentially
unlawful" appears to be based on the indirect assertion that the prosecutor threatened
that the prior convictions were "automatically permissible grounds for impeachment."
(Appellant's Brief, pp.8-9 ("this indicates that defense counsel made a tactical decision
based on a potentially unlawful threat by the prosecutor, as felony convictions are not
automatically permissible grounds for impeachment").) The record does not support
such an assertion. Wilbanks claimed his counsel told him he could not get police and
medical records because the "prosecution warned him if [he] tried to bring up that
information, the prosecution would get [him] convicted on being an ex-felon alone when
[he got] on the stand."

(R., p.70 (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts).)

That

comment in no way suggests that Wilbanks' prior convictions were "automatically
permissible grounds for impeachment," and Wilbanks presented no evidence his prior
felony convictions could not have been properly used to impeach him. The district court
correctly determined that, based on Wilbanks' own allegations, his counsel's actions
were within the scope of reasonable trial strategy or tactics. (R., pp.17-18.)
11

Additionally, Wilbanks has failed to support his claim with admissible evidence
substantiating the victim's prior "bad" acts - lying to police, filing false police reports,
admission to a state mental hospital after attempting suicide, drunkenness, and
quarrelsomeness.

(See R., pp.13-15.) Although Wilbanks attached a "recantation"

letter ostensibly typed by the victim regarding a 2009 incident which resulted in criminal
charges against Wilbanks, the letter bears no signature and Wilbanks provides no
explanation of how such letter would be admissible. (R., p.58); see Goodwin, 138 Idaho
at 272, 61 P.3d at 629; LePage, 138 Idaho at 806, 69 P.3d at 1067.

Moreover,

Wilbanks' account of what his counsel told him the prosecutor said is inadmissible
hearsay.
In sum, Wilbanks has failed to show his counsel's alleged deficient performance
was anything other than a tactical or strategic decision. "The constitutional requirement
for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can
dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might have been tried better."
Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992). That Wilbanks, in hindsight,
wishes his attorney made a different tactical decision does not make his defense
counsel objectively deficient.

See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 788 (2011)

("Rare are the situations in which the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical
decisions will be limited to only one technique or approach.") (citation and quotations
omitted).

The district court correctly concluded that Wilbanks failed to present a

genuine issue about whether his trial counsel made reasonable efforts to investigate the
victim's alleged prior bad acts and a reasonable strategic choice to not present
evidence of those acts through testimony by Wilbanks. In the face of a presumption of
12

competence and a trial record that shows the decisions by trial counsel were well within
the range of reasonable tactical decisions, Wilbanks has presented no viable evidence
that counsel acted objectively unreasonably, such as in ignorance of the facts or the
law.
Even assuming trial counsel's failure to call Wilbanks as a witness to testify about
the victim's alleged prior bad acts constitutes deficient performance, Wilbanks failed to
(as stated by the district court4) "allege[] facts that would show prejudice resulting from
the claimed deficient performance." 5

(R., pp.115-116.)

A chain of assumptions or

accusations is not evidence, and without evidentiary support, a post-conviction claim is
subject to summary dismissal. 6 State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136
(2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903).

Speculation does not establish prejudice.

"It is not

enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
proceeding." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787. Rather, the petitioner must show a reasonable
4

Despite its statement that Wilbanks has not "alleged facts that would show prejudice
resulting from the claimed performance[,]" the district court explained it was
unnecessary to reach the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard. (R., p.117 n.4.)

5

In his petition, Wilbanks claimed, "had trial counsel investigated and secured the ...
favorable evidence, and the jury been able to consider the material evidence of State's
[sic] main witness to be known for quarrelsomeness, confrontations with police, lying to
police, filing false police reports, and attempts at suicide while being intoxicated, along
with (her) blood alcohol level being twice the legal limit (.18) on the night of said
conviction, with the cumulative effect of testimonies by defense witness's [sic], and text
messages introduced at trial, would have put the witness's credibility on the outer limits
of due process, and exists [sic] a 'reasonable probability' the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different." (R., pp.14-15.)
6

The only evidence other than his own testimony submitted by Wilbanks was a
document showing that, in regard to a prior incident in 2009, the victim had a blood
alcohol content of 0.18. (See R., pp.64-65.) Wilbanks' allegations are not supported by
admissible evidence or a showing of how such evidence would be admissible.
13

probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding

would have been different.

kl

Wilbanks' bare assertion that the cumulative effect of

the victim's alleged prior bad acts and the other testimony and evidence would have
"put the witness's credibility on the outer limits of due process" (R., p.15) and create a
reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would have been different fails because it
is conclusory, speculative, and unsupported with admissible evidence. See Ferrier, 135
Idaho at 799, 25 P.3d at 112; Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Contrary to Wilbanks' argument, the district court explained that absent the
claimed errors, it was highly unlikely the jury would have returned a different verdict in
light of its findings that Wilbanks inflicted "a traumatic injury upon the victim by striking
her head and/or punching her in the face," and intimidated her by "threatening her with a
knife if she did not sign a recantation letter.(71telephoning and threatening to burn down
her house, repeatedly sending her text messages threatening to call Health and Welfare
on her, threatening to kill her, threatening to hurt her, and asking his friends to tell her
that she is breaking his mom's heart." (R., p.117 n.4.) Based on the district court's
reasoning (seen. 4, supra), Wilbanks failed to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.
Wilbanks has failed to show (1) trial counsel was deficient for failing to
reasonably investigate the victim's alleged prior bad acts, (2) trial counsel's tactical
decision to not call him as a witness to testify about the victim's alleged prior bad acts
was objectively deficient, and (3) any shortcoming in trial counsel's representation
Testimony that the victim signed a recantation letter in a prior criminal case against
Wilbanks would not have been perceived by the jury as evidence impeaching the
victim's credibility in the current case. Rather, such evidence would have strongly
suggested that the recantation letter in the prior case was made under duress.
7
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prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Wilbanks' petition and supporting affidavits failed to
create a material issue of fact as to either of the two elements necessary to establish an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and the district court correctly
dismissed his claim.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary
dismissal of Wilbanks' petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2013.

JOH,P(,C. McKINNEY
(
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 15th day of August, 2013, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
SPENCERJ.HAHN
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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